

What is an American city?

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For many years I have argued that in the decades after the Second World War, economic, demographic, and spatial transformations in the United States resulted in an urban form unlike any other in history. Recently, I realized that in one important way this formulation of recent urban history misleads, for it reports the outcome of history as singular when it should be plural. “Form” should be “forms”—what we have today is an unprecedented configuration of urban places that calls into question the definition of city itself.

The April 25, 2006, death of Jane Jacobs was one of the events that prompted me to rethink my narrative of recent urban history. If any one person can be anointed patron saint of urban studies, Jacobs deserves the crown. Her 1961 *Death and Life of Great American Cities* must be the most widely read and influential book ever written about American cities. After more than forty years, it retains its powerful impact. I have assigned it often to students, who invariably find it moving and convincing. *Death and Life* resonates with their ideal of urbanism and gives them a set of criteria for identifying a good city. With the book as a yardstick, they find that current-day cities come up short. Although the book has the same effect on me—new delights emerge every time I read it—recently, I wonder if it does as much to inhibit as to advance our grasp of American cities today. Its identification of mixed use, short blocks, multi-age dwellings, and density as defining a healthy neighborhood

is based on models of old cities like Philadelphia, New York, Boston, or many of the cities of Europe. At least implicitly, this makes recapturing the past the goal of urban reform. Yet, the growing, dynamic, vibrant components of urban America are more like Phoenix and Los Angeles than the old East Coast cities. With Jacobs’s criteria, they never can qualify as good cities; mutant forms of urbanism, they repel rather than attract anyone who loves cities. But is this a useful assessment? Is the fault with these cities or with the criteria? Did Jacobs bequeath us a definition of urbanism or do we need a different set of markers to characterize what makes a city—and a good city—in early-twenty-first-century America? Certainly, the former view—the belief in a core set of ideas defining healthy urbanism—underlies one of the most influential urban design movements of today: new urbanism. New urbanism does not take Jacobs’s criteria literally, although her spirit is visible in its emphasis on density, mixed residential and commercial use, pedestrian-friendly streets, and vibrant public spaces. Its charter defines a set of principles it considers adaptable to a wide array of places from suburbs to shopping malls. The other view, which finds new urbanism an exercise in nostalgia out of touch with the forces driving urban change, is represented by Robert Bruegmann in his 2005 *Sprawl: A Compact History*. He cites approvingly a writer who “persuasively argues that the New Urbanism is only the latest version of a long-standing

desire by cultural elites to manage middle-class urban life.”

Even more than Jacobs’s death, what forced me to confront the protean quality of today’s urbanism and the inadequacy of singular definitions was my research on a book, *One Nation Divisible: What America Was and What It Is Becoming*, co-authored with Mark J. Stern. Stern and I set out to examine how the 2000 U.S. Census reflected social and economic trends during the preceding century. We concluded that America is living through a transformation as profound as the industrial revolution—one that reshapes everything, from family to class, from race and gender to cities. Events on the ground have undermined the standard concepts with which we interpret public life: work, city, race, family, nationality. All of them have lost their moorings in the way life is actually lived today. Their conventional meanings lie smashed, badly in need of redefinition.

The same situation occurred during the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, when an emergent industrial civilization, based on a global economy, shattered existing ideas, producing, among other changes, a new urban form: the industrial city. “‘Modern industry,’ is almost equivalent to ‘city life,’” observed University of Chicago sociologist Charles Henderson in 1909, “because the great industry, the factory system, builds cities around the chimneys of steam engines and electric plants.” The emergence of this new urban form energized late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century social science and reform. With their focus on applied research, social scientists in both Europe and the United States tried to figure out how to respond to the problems of housing, poverty, public health, employment, and governance posed by this new entity, which they understood only imperfectly. Others, like Max Weber and Georg Simmel, searched for its essence as they advanced new theories of the city. In the United States, the attempt to define the industrial city culminated in the work of the Chicago School, which based its model on the interaction of industrial change, immigration, and social geography. The geographer Peirce Lewis calls this urban form, described “in any sixth-grade geography book written before the [Second World] war” as the “nucleated city.” This nucleated city and its compact suburbs no longer exist. What has taken their place?

My point that we need new answers to the question of what constitutes an American city is hardly original. If you poke around just a little in current writing about cities it pops up, either explicitly or by implication. A keen observer, in fact, could find the dissolution of conventional urban form described much earlier than the closing decades of the twentieth century. In his monumental 1961 jeremiad, *The City in History*, Lewis Mumford asked, “What is the shape of the city and how does it define itself? The original container has completely disappeared: the sharp division between city and country no longer exists.” In the same year (also, remarkably, the same year as *Death and Life*), geographer Jean Gottman used the term Megalopolis, the title of his massive book, to describe the “almost continuous stretch of urban and suburban areas from southern New Hampshire to northern Virginia and from the Atlantic shore to the Appalachian foothills.” Within this territory, the “old distinctions between rural and urban” no longer applied. As a result, within Megalopolis, “we must abandon the idea of the city as a tightly settled and organized unit in which people, activities, and riches are crowded into a very small area clearly separated from its nonurban surroundings.” Although Megalopolis was most developed in the northeastern United States, it represented the future of the world. More recently, in his iconoclastic history of sprawl, Bruegmann observes, “With the penetration of urban functions into the countryside, the old distinctions between urban, suburban, and rural have collapsed.”

Pronouncements by authorities are one way to illustrate the need to redefine what city means in the early twenty-first century. Another emerges clearly from contrasting actual cities. Philadelphia and Los Angeles, for instance, provide especially apt comparisons because they embody the old and the new urban America.

In *The Next Los Angeles*, Robert Gottlieb and his colleagues observe, “To understand the future of America, one needs to understand Los Angeles. Nearly every trend that is currently transforming the United States...has appeared in some form in Los Angeles.” This new megalopolis was shaped by the automobile rather than the railroad, which, along with the streetcar, did so much to define America’s industrial cities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. L.A.’s heterogeneous population—far more di-

verse than Philadelphia's ever was—came from around the globe as well as from all over America. L.A.'s sprawling, multicentered, multiethnic regional development posed a dramatic contrast to the old model of a single, dense core surrounded by residential zones and a suburban periphery, exemplified by the Philadelphia region. Even though service industries dominated its economy to an unprecedented degree, Los Angeles probably was America's most important twentieth-century industrial city. At mid century, its aerospace industry replaced Pennsylvania's shipbuilders as the heart of the military-industrial complex, while factory jobs migrated from the Northeast and Midwest to the South, West, and overseas. Los Angeles emerged as a major center in the Pacific basin and an important player in the global economy. Philadelphia, on the other hand, could not surmount its place as a second-order city on the international stage.

The contrast between Philadelphia and Los Angeles reflected not only changes in the two cities over time but also America's divergent regional history. Phoenix, Houston, Las Vegas, and other sunbelt cities more or less followed the Los Angeles model and grew rapidly. Old industrial cities, like Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Detroit, lost manufacturing jobs and population. Philadelphia represents a city surrounded by suburbs, Los Angeles a product of "suburban urbanization," where center and periphery meld into sprawling cities that lack a meaningful center. The stark contrasts between Philadelphia and Los Angeles—their diverse regional histories, economic and demographic differences, and divergent social ecologies—pose an unavoidable question: in early-twenty-first-century America, Just what is a city?

TRANSFORMATIONS

Despite their differences, Philadelphia and Los Angeles experienced the common transformations of economy, demography, and space that have led to new American cities. The decimation of manufacturing evident in Philadelphia and other rustbelt cities resulted from both the growth of foreign industries, notably electronics and automobiles, and the cor-

porate search for cheaper labor. Cities with economic sectors other than manufacturing, such as banking, commerce, medicine, government, and education, withstood deindustrialization most successfully—for example, New York, Miami, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area, Chicago, Boston, and Houston. Those with no alternatives—Baltimore, Cleveland, Buffalo, St. Louis, Detroit—nearly collapsed. Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the Twin Cities struggled with mixed success. Cities such as Las Vegas; Phoenix; Albuquerque; and, in some ways, New Orleans built economies on entertainment, hospitality, and retirement.

As services replaced manufacturing everywhere, office towers became the late twentieth century's urban factories. A broad category, service embraces both demanding and rewarding jobs and low-wage, nonunionized employment that offers few benefits. In the fortunate cities like Los Angeles, new economic functions included the production of the financial and business services and products that served the emergent international economy. They also included, as, again, notably in Los Angeles, the reappearance of small-scale manufacturing drawing on inexpensive immigrant labor.

The first urban demographic transformation was the migration of African Americans from the South to northern and midwestern, even, to some extent, western cities. (As James Gregory has shown, in the same years, more than twice as many white southerners also moved to the North and Midwest.) As African Americans moved into cities, whites moved out. Between 1950 and 1970, overall, the population of American cities grew by ten million people, and the population of suburbs by eighty-five million. Even more than racial change, a severe urban housing shortage, a desire to escape urban congestion, and mass-produced suburban homes made affordable by federally insured, long-term, low-interest mortgages pulled whites from cities. They sped to their suburban homes along the new interstate highway system. Aggressive and often unscrupulous realtors, fanning fears of racial change, played a role as well. In the North and Midwest the number of African American newcomers often did not equal the number of whites who left. As a result, city populations and density went down, returning swaths of inner cities to empty lots and weed-filled fields where once working-class

housing and factories had stood—a process vividly captured by the great photographer Camillo José Vergara, who has documented the emergence of the “green ghetto” in rustbelt America. In the sunbelt, in cities like Los Angeles, population trends went in the opposite direction. Between 1957 and 1990, the sunbelt’s urban population, lured by economic opportunity and an appealing climate and boosted by annexation as well as in-migration, climbed from eight-and-a-half to twenty-three million.

Massive immigration following changes to federal law in 1965 also transformed urban demography. More immigrants entered the United States in the 1990s than in any other decade in its history. Mostly from Asia and Latin America, these immigrants altered the ethnic mix of America’s population, most notably of its cities, and fueled most of the urban population growth that occurred during the 1990s. Four of five settled in metropolitan areas, clustering in “gateway” cities: New York; Miami; Los Angeles; and, to some extent, Chicago. By 2000, they had begun to spread out across the nation, transforming suburbs and both small and large cities. Thanks to labor market networks in agricultural work, construction, landscaping, low-end manufacturing, and domestic service, Hispanics spread out faster than any other ethnic group in American history. In 1910, 84 percent of the foreign born in greater Philadelphia lived in the central city. By 2006, the number had plummeted to 35 percent. Similar trends appeared everywhere. Across the nation, the suburbanization of immigration became a major factor reshaping metropolitan geography.

Suburbanization and racial segregation transformed urban space. Suburban growth, which had begun much earlier, exploded in the years after the Second World War, with suburbs growing ten times faster than cities in the 1950s. Population, retailing, services, and industry all suburbanized. Suburbs remained predominantly white until late in the twentieth century, when immigrants and African Americans began moving out of the center cities in significant numbers—although even in the suburbs African Americans often clustered in segregated neighborhoods or dominated some suburban towns. Within cities, racial segregation increased through 1970, with

growing numbers of African Americans clustered in districts of concentrated poverty. Racial segregation was much higher in late- than in early-twentieth-century American cities. In the 1990s, although segregation in cities declined by an average of 5.5 percentage points, the average African American still lived in a census tract more than half black, while affluent African Americans were more likely to live near African Americans with modest incomes than near comparably well-off whites. Growing economic as well as racial inequality reconfigured urban space as well. Economic segregation among whites, for instance, grew notably after the 1970s.

In the decades after the Second World War, redevelopment also transformed city space, as urban renewal displaced poor residents, usually without relocating them to alternate housing, and cleared downtown land for reuse as offices, retailing, and homes for the affluent. Public housing, by and large, remained confined to segregated districts and never matched existing needs. Gentrification, the rehabilitation of working-class housing for use by a wealthier class, played a modest counterpoint to urban renewal. Movement into gentrified neighborhoods was not large enough to reverse overall population decline outside of select neighborhoods, but it did transform cityscapes as it attracted young, white professionals with above-average incomes and empty-nesters who demanded new services and amenities.

At the same time, married couples with children made up a shrinking percentage of suburban populations. In a sample of fourteen representative metropolitan areas, between 1970 and 2000, the proportion of suburban census tracts where married couples and their children composed more than half of all households plummeted from 59 percent to 12 percent. In the same years, the share of the suburban population living in census tracts where young, unmarried people between eighteen and thirty-five living alone or without relatives predominated rocketed from 8 percent to 35 percent. These changes subverted the suburbs’ historic function as providers of housing for families with children. The result was a new domestic landscape that increasingly called into question the meaning of “suburb” as well as “city.”

URBAN METAPHORS

By the early twenty-first century, economic, demographic, and spatial transformations had undercut all the existing definitions, and a variety of new urban metaphors competed to replace them. One set of metaphors looks inward toward central cities; another set looks outward to metropolitan areas; regions; and, indeed, the world. The two sets are not mutually exclusive. Sometimes the same writers use different metaphors to capture the increasingly fractured reality of “urban” or “city.” All of them, however, try to make sense of the patterns of inequality that grew out of the economic, demographic, and spatial transformation of American cities in the second half of the twentieth century. The inward-looking metaphor that still comes first to mind is “inner city,” which, since the 1960s, has served as shorthand for a bundle of problems—disorder, crime, drugs, poverty, homelessness, out-of-wedlock births. As a metaphor, inner city was colored poor and black. So pervasive did the image become that it spawned a new genre of popular culture that diffused outward from inner cities to the American heartland. According to *Maclean's*, “Urban music,” a category that includes “funk, soul, and hip hop, as well as R and B” became “the biggest selling genre in the United States.”

“Postindustrial,” another inward-looking metaphor, focused on the loss of urban manufacturing rather than on demography and social structure. Political scientist John H. Mollenkopf identified a “profound transformation” that had

seriously eroded the nineteenth-century industrial city. For lack of a better term, it might be called “the postindustrial revolution.” This second urban revolution grew out of and in many ways constituted a reaction against the first. If labor and capital concentrated into factories defined the industrial city, the postindustrial city is characterized by the geographic diffusion of production and population. The office building, not the factory, now provides the organizing institution of the central city.

Vivid though it was, analytic usefulness of the metaphor “postindustrial” was limited. It

defined the city by what it was not rather than by what it had become.

“Dual City,” a third inward-looking metaphor, focused on the social structure that had emerged from economic and demographic transformation abetted by governments—federal, state, and local—that remapped the distribution of classes and functions across urban space and, through funding cuts, decimated services. Growing class polarization, a problem everywhere in the nation (and, indeed, as Mike Davis shows, in even more extreme forms around the globe), appeared most vividly in big cities. Increasingly bereft of their middle class, city populations divided between rich and poor, the former buoyed by jobs in finance, information, and high-end services, the latter barely sustained by low-end service jobs, the informal economy, or government assistance.

This was the dual city. Its two worlds, the gleaming office towers and condos and the run-down housing and public ghettos of the poor, were not two separate spheres. Indeed, dual-city theorists stressed the links that joined them: they produced and depended on one another. Although the dual-city metaphor, as its theorists recognized, oversimplified a very complicated situation, it had the virtue of directing attention to the new inequalities that define current-day cities, just as Jacob Riis’s depiction in *How the Other Half Lives* captured the emerging industrial social structure a century ago.

A variety of outward-looking metaphors—“city region,” “metropolitan area,” “elastic/inelastic city,” “galactic city”—try to capture the extension of cities beyond their legal boundaries. Three public intellectuals—David Rusk, Myron Orfield, and Bruce Katz—have led the effort to substitute metropolitan for narrowly bounded definitions of current-day cities. For them, the exercise is more than theoretical, because policies needed to counteract the baneful effects of metropolitan political fragmentation require an expanded definition of “city.” No less concerned with inequality than dual-city theorists, they focus more on economic and political disparities between central cities and their suburbs than on income gaps among city residents. Grossly unequal public services and tax burdens, environmental degradation, sprawl, racial segregation, anemic job growth: these, they argue, can be countered only through metropolitan-wide actions.

Where city and suburb rubbed up against each other, they were becoming more alike. As urban problems spread outward, distinctions lessened, and the real differentiation separated older inner suburbs from those further out on the periphery of metropolitan areas, which, themselves, could not remain immune from the urban problems attendant on growth. Just what a suburb was, what made it distinct, was no longer clear. Recognizing the inadequacy of the conventional city/suburb/rural distinction, the U.S. Census Bureau began to develop a reclassification of municipalities based on a sophisticated mathematical model, which, if it works, should greatly facilitate comparative urban research and policy development.

Historian Robert Fishman proclaimed the end of the era of the suburb defined as a sylvan residential enclave for affluent male-headed families, a “bourgeois utopia” of commuters. By the 1980s, he held, the classic suburb had been replaced by the “post-suburb” or “technoburb.” Others reclassified suburbs differently. Orfield divided metropolitan areas into six categories of municipalities based on their financial capacity and age. “Suburbia conceals as well as reveals its complexity,” observes historian Delores Hayden in *Building Suburbia*. “For years, when urban historians wrote about the ‘city,’ they meant the center, the skyline, downtown.” Looking closely, she identifies seven suburban patterns. Although the earliest date from before the Civil War, vestiges of all of them still exist. The most famous, or notorious, new suburban forms are Joel Garreau’s “edge cities,” massive configurations of office towers and malls at the crossroads of exurban highways, “[a] new frontier being shaped by the free, in a constantly reinvented land.” Recently, Robert E. Lang and his colleagues identified “boomburbs,” the “ultimate symbol of today’s sprawling postwar metropolitan form.” These are places “with more than one hundred thousand residents that are *not* the largest cities in their respective metropolitan areas and that have maintained double-digit rates of population growth in recent decades.” Others, like geographer Wei Li, focusing on the new suburbanization of immigration, have identified a suburban variant they call “ethnoburbs,” which “serve as bridges between historical ethnic neighborhoods and the broader region.” Peirce Lewis has termed the new urban form that developed “far beyond the old urban

fringe” the “galactic city,” defined as “a city where all the traditional urban elements float in space like stars and planets in a galaxy, held together by mutual gravitational attraction but with large empty spaces in between.... This new galactic city is an urban creation different from any sort Americans have ever seen before.” With chain migration linking towns and villages in Latin America and the Caribbean with U.S. cities, Mike Davis writes of the creation of new suburban forms extending across national boundaries as “transnational suburbs.”

Metropolitan metaphors linked cities to their regions; global metaphors joined them to the world. Saskia Sassen, whose work set the agenda for debate on global cities, identifies a set of such cities at the pinnacle of new urban hierarchies, detached from their regions and connected, instead, to the world of international finance and trade. As “transnational market ‘spaces,’” global cities have “more in common with one another than with regional centers in their own nation-states, many of which have declined in importance.” The “finance and producer services complex in each city,” she asserts, “rests on a growth dynamic that is somewhat independent of the broader regional economy—a sharp change from the past, when a city was presumed to be deeply articulated with its hinterland.” Rather than regional centers, global cities are “command points in the organization of the world economy.” Economic globalization has made great cities more relevant and important than ever, a point reinforced by a July 2006 report describing the movement of corporate headquarters *back* to New York City.

A *second* outward-looking metaphor defines modern cities by what they produce. For Manuel Castells, the late-twentieth-century “informational city” replaces the early-twentieth-century “industrial city.” To be sure, knowledge and information processing have been important to every mode of production. What distinguishes the informational mode “is the action of knowledge upon knowledge itself as the main source of productivity.” The informational city differs from Garreau’s edge city, whose “primitive technological vision that sees the world through the simplified lenses of endless freeways and fiber-optic networks” misses “the core of the new urbanization process” in the United

States. Unlike Garreau and Sassen, Castells stresses the interdependence of edge cities and the “functional interdependence” among “different units and processes in a given urban system over very long distances, minimizing the role of territorial contiguity and maximizing the communication networks in all their dimensions. Flows of exchange are at the core of the American edge city.” The second point missed by Garreau’s metaphor is the multiple dependencies at the heart of America’s distinctive informational city: “the profile of America’s informational city is not fully represented by the edge city phenomenon but by the relationship between fast exurban development, inner-city decay, and obsolescence of the suburban built environment.” Castells’s informational city is better understood as a network than a place, a process rather than an object. In the United States, the Information Age also has given rise to a distinctive suburban form, what Margaret Pugh O’Mara identifies as “cities of knowledge,” residential and high-tech industrial nodes built around major research universities.

In the early twenty-first century, these metaphors—inner city, postindustrial city, dual city, city-region, edge city, galactic city, global city, informational city, city of knowledge—compete to answer the question, What is an American city? All of them are both useful and partial. Their utility depends on the angle of interest—inward vs. outward, national vs. global—and the concern—inequality, environmental degradation, aesthetic value, political fragmentation, the possibility of community, for instance. They are, moreover, not entirely consistent. Garreau’s cheerful optimism about the future of edge cities contrasts with Hayden’s withering attack, and Sassen’s emphasis on the importance of place and contiguity in global cities contrasts with Castells’s stress on a-geographic networks. The work of assessing and reconciling multiple metaphors and exploring their implications is a central and urgent task for interdisciplinary urban studies. Economic, demographic, and spatial transformation have exploded old ideas of cities and suburbs, turning them into encumbrances to the reformulation of helpful public policies.

At both ends of the twentieth century, profound economic change forced redefinitions of “city.” In the late nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries, the industrial city emerged as the new urban form, and a host of commentators tried to define its character. The problems they identified, and the issues on which they concentrated, are remarkably similar to those on the agenda of urbanists in the early twenty-first century. Only now, as we have seen, the model of the old industrial city is gone forever. The question, then, is how to characterize what has taken its place. What is an American city? The answer remains far from clear.

One point about this history requires emphasis. A huge difference between the early and late twentieth century lies in the response to urban redefinition. Early-twentieth-century reformers, struggling to define and tame industrial cities, grappled with the consequences of massive immigration by people with different cultures, the lack of affordable housing, the growth of poverty and homelessness, crises in public health and sanitation, and the impact of growing concentrations of wealth on society and politics. They worried about the role of privatization in municipal services, the heavy hand of state government, the weakness of mayoral authority, the corruption of machine politics, the inefficiencies and inequities of the courts, and the regressive and inadequate foundation of city finances on property taxes.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cities tried to respond to these issues with active government—what historians have labeled progressivism. Despite the persistence of corruption, widespread poverty, and racial discrimination, cities increased municipal expenditures, professionalized their administrations, and constructed buildings and infrastructures that supported the most vibrant and successful era in American urban history. In the late twentieth century, by contrast, the response to similar issues was the withdrawal of active government, evident in reduced federal funds, reliance on market-based solutions to urban problems, and the need to turn to private initiatives, like special service districts, to carry out public functions, such as street cleaning and security. The results are everywhere to be seen, in homelessness on city streets, poverty spreading outward to inner suburbs, uncontrolled sprawl eating up open space, crumbling infrastructure, gross in-

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equity in spending on public education, the future of urban finance mortgaged to casino gambling, the incapacity to prevent or respond effectively to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the subprime mortgage crisis. The widely heralded comeback of American cities is thin and fragile. If you move away from shiny center cities, it is not nearly so visible. Look at city budgets, and it does not seem nearly so robust. The question, "What is an American city?" has begun to elicit both a cacophony of definitions and an array of intelligent and promising ideas about how to respond. But we have yet to see a powerful and pervasive new urban pro-

gressivism. Clearly, though, without the will to forge an effective and coordinated political response, the future of American cities, however defined, is unlikely to be as buoyant as their past.

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